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Abridging the Fifth Amendment:
Compelled Decryption, Passwords,
& Biometrics
Raila Cinda Brejt*
Technological developments change the way we perform tasks
by creating more efficient solutions to old problems and giving rise
to opportunities not previously possible. Advances in communications technology have made the world feel smaller and more accessible. These changes also affect the methodology of both criminal
activity and the investigative procedures of law enforcement. Our
fundamental rights are challenged as judges and state actors try to
strike the perfect balance between longstanding values and contemporary problems. This Note considers the Fifth Amendment challenges that arise when law enforcement attempts to obtain evidence
from a criminal defendant’s encrypted device. This Note will argue
that the application of the foregone conclusion doctrine of the Fifth
Amendment should require the government to show independent
knowledge of the contents of the device that they seek prior to courts
granting decryption compulsion orders of the criminal defendant’s
personal device. Biometric decryption should be considered the
same as password encryption and distinguished from the physical
act exceptions to the protections of the Fifth Amendment. To preserve the protections of the Fifth Amendment, we must resist the development of ambiguous and abridged doctrines that carry the potential to swallow our fundamental rights.
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INTRODUCTION

Computers, tablets, and smart phones are museums of their owners’ minds as these devices record the users’ social media, shopping,
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and online dating habits while tracking location, health information,
political affiliation, and so on.1 The longer a person owns and utilizes their device, the more information the device has stored about
the user. But users like to think they can keep their information away
from the hands of others by encrypting it. In most circumstances,
this should be sufficient. However, in the event that a person has a
run-in with the law, it may become more complicated.
Professors Orin Kerr, of Berkley Law, and Bruce Schneier,
security technologist, note that encryption technology has become
widespread in recent years.2 In the event that the government seeks
evidence from a suspect’s decrypted device, government investigators need to find an encryption workaround to convert the encrypted
data from the encrypted digital devices to a decrypted and readable
format.3 Kerr and Schneier discuss six types of encryption workarounds;4 this Note will focus solely on what they refer to as “compelling the key,”5 wherein the government orders an individual
to decrypt a device that is suspected or known to be under the
dominion of a particular individual.6 This method of decryption
implicates Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, which is currently inadequate for protecting criminal defendants, as the doctrine is not fully
fleshed out.

1

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396 (2014) (“Mobile application software on a cell
phone, or ‘apps,’ offer a range of tools for managing detailed information about all aspects
of a person’s life. There are apps for Democratic Party news and Republican Party news;
apps for alcohol, drug, and gambling addictions; apps for sharing prayer requests; apps for
tracking pregnancy symptoms; apps for planning your budget; apps for every conceivable
hobby or pastime; apps for improving your romantic life. There are popular apps for buying
or selling just about anything, and the records of such transactions may be accessible on
the phone indefinitely. There are over a million apps available in each of the two major app
stores; the phrase ‘there’s an app for that’ is now part of the popular lexicon. The average
smart phone user has installed 33 apps, which together can form a revealing montage of
the user’s life.”).
2
Orin S. Kerr & Bruce Schneier, Encryption Workarounds, 106 GEO. L.J. 989, 990
(2018).
3
Id. at 990–91.
4
Id. at 996.
5
Id. at 1000.
6
Id.
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Furthermore, the usage of biometrics,7 in place of a password,
adds to the complexity of modernizing the Fifth Amendment privilege. Biometric decryption technology has existed for some time,
but on September 19, 2013, Apple Inc.’s sale of the iPhone 5 provided biometric decryption technology to the average consumer.8
Unfortunately, our Fifth Amendment rights are at risk until it is legally determined how they interact with law enforcements’ methodologies. It is important that the Fifth Amendment be construed liberally to protect defendants from the depreciation of their constitutional rights against self-incrimination.9
Part I of this Note will introduce the current binding precedent,
as well as some gaps which lower courts have attempted to fill in.
Part II considers the State v. Stahl case, with some of its problematic
progeny, showing how radically the foregone conclusion doctrine
can be misconstrued. Part III advocates that a password should not
be considered a foregone conclusion based solely on showing ownership of the device and that the government must show independent
knowledge of the evidence they seek prior to acquiring a compulsion
order. To properly safeguard criminal defendants’ constitutional
rights, courts must adopt the narrowest interpretation of any doctrine
which puts the defendants’ rights in jeopardy.

7

Maria Korolov, What Is Biometrics? 10 Physical and Behavioral Identifiers That Can
Be
Used
for
Authentication,
CSO
(Feb.
12,
2019,
6:00
AM),
https://www.csoonline.com/article/3339565/what-is-biometrics-and-why-collectingbiometric-data-is-risky.html [https://perma.cc/3M8A-M4XT] (defining biometrics as
“physical or behavioral human characteristics…[which] can be used to digitally identify a
person to grant access to systems, devices or data” including fingerprint ID and facial
recognition).
8
Kara Goldman, Biometric Passwords and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 211, 212 (2015).
9
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921) (“It has been repeatedly decided
that [the Fifth Amendment] should receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy
encroachment upon or ‘gradual depreciation’ of the rights secured by [it], by imperceptible
practice of courts or by well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officers.”).
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WHERE IT ALL BEGINS: CONTEXT FOR THE CLASH OF TECHNOLOGY AND
THE LAW

A. Encryption, Passwords, and Biometrics
The government will often seek to obtain evidence from a suspect’s digital device to link the suspect to the crime.10 These digital
devices—such as computers, tablets, and cell phones—carry a vast
array of information that can reveal a rather intimate understanding
of the user’s hobbies, views, and relationships.11 However, any content that is stored on digital devices can be encrypted.12 Encryption
utilizes an algorithm to convert information into a format that cannot
be read or accessed.13 Decryption involves causing the algorithm to
be performed in the reverse to unscramble the data and make it readable to the device holder.14 The device’s encryption key must be
triggered to reverse the algorithm.15 This key is established and preprogrammed into the device by the device manufacturer.16 The device user does not know the preprogrammed decryption key in the
device’s operating system, which controls the encryption process;
rather, users who wish to encrypt their device can set their own password which serves to trigger the device to provide the decryption
key.17 Once the user enters their password into the digital device, the
password decrypts the key, which in turn decrypts the actual content
on the digital device.18 Therefore, in order to access data stored on
an encrypted digital device, a device holder must know the device’s
password.
Consumers can use their physical biometric features to avoid entering the password to decrypt their various devices equipped with
these capabilities.19 Biometric feature decryption utilizes scans of
10

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 379 (2014).
Id. at 396–97.
12
Kerr & Schneier, supra note 2, at 993.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 994–95.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 994.
18
Id. at 994–95.
19
United States v. Sealed Warrant, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147836, at *11 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 16, 2019).
11
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the user’s face, eye, or fingerprint.20 In order to set up biometric decryption, the user must first set a password on the device.21 When
presented with the correct biometric features, these features trigger
the digital device to utilize the user-established password to decrypt
the device’s decryption key, which subsequently decrypts the digital
device.22
B. “I Plead the Fifth”: Fifth Amendment Protections
The goal of the right against self-incrimination is “to avoid confronting the witness with the ‘cruel trilemma’ of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt.”23 The essence of the cruel trilemma is forcing
the defendant to “communicate an express or implied assertion of
fact or belief” where the defendant’s choices are limited to “truth,
falsity, or silence” and suffering the consequences of their choice.24
To avoid confessions obtained by cruel treatment,25 the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution protects a person from
being compelled to act as a “witness against himself.”26 The three
elements of the Fifth Amendment privilege are: “(1) compulsion of
a (2) testimonial communication that is (3) incriminating.”27 Traditionally, the Fifth Amendment privilege has served to prohibit the
government from compelling a criminal defendant to take the stand
and say things against their own penal interest or to force them to
incriminate themselves.28

20

Id. at 12.
Michael Price & Zach Simonetti, Defending Device Decryption Cases, 43 CHAMPION
42, 42 (2019).
22
Id.
23
In re Martin-Trigona, 732 F.2d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 50 (1964)).
24
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 597 (1990).
25
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973).
26
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27
United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1979) (interpreting Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)).
28
Couch, 409 U.S. at 327.
21
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1. Establishing the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine – The
Trilogy
Fifth Amendment protections are not limited to speech. According to the Supreme Court, compelled actions can be considered testimonial communications.29 In Fisher v. United States,30 the Court
considered whether compelling an attorney to provide his client’s
tax paperwork to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) constituted
compelled self-incrimination in conflict with his Fifth Amendment
right.31 The right against producing one’s own incriminating papers
is supported by longstanding jurisprudence.32 The preexisting documents are not protected, but the action of having to provide them
against yourself is.33 However, the Fisher Court concluded that neither the attorney nor the client’s Fifth Amendment right allowed for
denying an enforcement action by the IRS.34 The Court held that
asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege is specific to barring the
“use of ‘physical or moral compulsion’ exerted on the person.”35
The Fifth Amendment only prevents incrimination by the defendant’s own compelled testimonial communications.36 Here, the subpoenaed documents were prepared by the defendant’s accountant
and therefore, did not constitute testimonial declarations against the
defendant taxpayer—rather, it was merely a surrender.37
The Fisher Court observed that the very act of production can
be communicative by admitting possession, control, and the existence of the produced items.38 The key inquiry of the potentially
communicative nature of compelled production concerns the context of the production.39 To determine if compelled production becomes testimonial and therefore conflicts with the defendant’s Fifth
29

See generally Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
Id.
31
Id.
32
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
33
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 407.
34
Id. at 405, 414.
35
Id. at 397 (quoting Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918)) (emphasis added).
36
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 410; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 771 F.2d 143, 145 (6th Cir. 1985).
39
See United States v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1099 (1984).
30
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Amendment right, it is pertinent to determine whether producing the
evidence signifies a link in the evidentiary chain by providing the
government with information they did not previously have.40
There are certain long-standing exceptions that are exempt from
the Fifth Amendment’s protection, such as: having blood drawn for
a blood-alcohol test;41 being compelled to provide voice and handwriting samples;42 and being compelled to try on clothing or appear
in front of the jury.43 Additionally, the required records exception44
and the corporate records exception45 also remove compliance with
a governmental demand for documents outside the protections of the
Fifth Amendment.
Two Supreme Court cases furthered Fisher’s doctrine of the
communicative nature of producing documents. In the first case,
United States v. Hubbell, the Court utilized Fisher’s “foregone conclusion” doctrine.46 This doctrine applies when the witness’ production of the documents provided evidence that the government already had knowledge of, thus, the witness does not provide any additional information to the government.47 When the existence, location, and authenticity of the property in question is already a foregone conclusion, the Fifth Amendment does not apply because it is
a matter of surrender rather than testimony.48 The Hubbell Court
found that the government cannot pursue charges against an individual who produced documents after receiving immunity because
without this production the government had no other source or
40

See, e.g., id. at 1084.
E.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762 (1966).
42
E.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1967).
43
E.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910).
44
E.g., United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated September 9, 2011),
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156979, at *19–20 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2011) (discussing the
required records exception, which is triggered when an individual engages in an activity
that has a mandatory record-keeping requirement which obligates the individual to have
these records).
45
E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum dated June 13, 1983 & June 22, 722
F.2d 981, 986–88 (2d Cir. 1983) (discussing the corporate records exception, which
compels officers of a corporation to provide the corporation’s records if subpoenaed by the
government).
46
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 44–45 (2000).
47
Doe v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 383 F.3d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 2004).
48
See id.
41
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knowledge of the existence and location of these documents.49 To
sustain such an indictment subsequent to a grant of immunity for the
production of these documents, the government would have to show
a “wholly independent” source from which it obtained the same evidence.50
In the second case, Doe v. United States, the Court notes that the
Fifth Amendment protects the contents of an individual’s mind from
compelled disclosure.51 This case involved the government’s interest in gaining information about the defendant’s offshore bank accounts.52 To obtain this information, the bank required the government to provide a consent form signed by the defendant.53 The defendant asserted that compelling his signature on a consent form
would be a violation of his Fifth Amendment right.54 In a famous
footnote responding to an argument from the dissenting Justice Stevens, the majority contrasts the particular type of consent directive
the defendant is being compelled to sign with being compelled to
provide the “combination to [a] wall safe.”55 Subsequently, in Hubbell, this statement made its way into the text of the majority opinion
which Justice Stevens authored.56
2. What is “Foregone” in the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine?
To address the changing Fifth Amendment inquiries, courts have
utilized the language in Hubbell to develop elements to the foregone
conclusion test.57 This test requires the government to have prior
knowledge of the “location, existence, and authentic[ity]” of the

49

See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44–45.
Id. at 45 (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972)).
51
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210–11 (1988).
52
Id at 202–03.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 204.
55
Id. at 210 n.9 (“In our view, such compulsion is more like ‘be[ing] forced to surrender
a key to a strongbox containing incriminating documents’ than it is like ‘be[ing] compelled
to reveal the combination to [petitioner’s] wall safe.’”).
56
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000).
57
See Jesse Coulon, Privacy, Screened Out: Analyzing the Threat to Individual Privacy
Rights and Fifth Amendment Protections in State v. Stahl, 59 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 225,
234 (2018).
50

1164

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:1154

evidence it seeks.58 These three elements act as barriers against governmental compulsion of evidence from an individual. If the government can show sufficient prior knowledge of the evidence’s location and existence, and can independently prove its authenticity,
then compelling the defendant to produce this evidence is not selfincriminating and, therefore, permissible under the Fifth Amendment since the government already knew about it.59
The standard for the government’s showing of prior knowledge
to establish the foregone conclusion is the “reasonable particularity”
standard. The language of this standard originates from a Second
Circuit case which the Hubbell Court utilized to demonstrate that
the government was unable to establish knowledge of what documents they sought from Hubbell.60 When the case was granted certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed with the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion
that the government failed its burden of showing adequate prior
knowledge based on their overbroad request.61 Therefore, it would
violate Hubbell’s Fifth Amendment right to be compelled to provide
documents to the government because he would essentially be doing
the work of incriminating himself for them.62
3. It’s Complicated: Differing Opinions
Applying the foregone conclusion doctrine can be complicated.
Currently, there is no binding precedent on how to apply its socalled elements, and the reasonable particularity standard is largely
undefined. This has led courts to examine the issue from a variety
of angles, attempting to balance the needs of the government with
the Fifth Amendment rights of the accused. Below is an attempt to

58

See id. at n.50; Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 32 (“The question the District Court should have
addressed was the extent of the Government’s independent knowledge of the documents’
existence and authenticity, and of respondent’s possession or control of them.”).
59
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44–45.
60
United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[W]e agree with the
Second Circuit that the government must establish its knowledge of the existence,
possession, and authenticity of subpoenaed documents with ‘reasonable particularity’
before the communication inherent in the act of production can be considered a foregone
conclusion.”).
61
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 29–30, 44–45.
62
Id. at 45.
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summarize some of the current arguments in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence for compelling decryption of a digital device.
a) Possession: Whose Phone Is It Anyway?
Every detail must be considered when analyzing actions for their
testimonial nature. The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeals has
held that compelled decryption is not a foregone conclusion because
decryption acts as a communication.63 In a case where the government was seeking the decryption of a phone retrieved from a household with several individuals, the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division noted that being able to open
the phone communicated possession and control over the device.64
Therefore, compelling individuals to use their fingerprint to try to
open a phone “tacitly concedes” ownership, unless the government
can show prior knowledge of whose phone it is.65 If, once opened,
the device contains evidence of the owner’s illegal activity, then
opening the phone incriminates the opener and is, therefore, testimonial.
b) What Is a Password?
Typically, the password itself is not direct evidence. Analogizing the text of the Hubbell decision that “compelled testimony that
communicates information that may ‘lead to incriminating evidence’ is privileged even if the information itself is not inculpatory,”66 the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
Southern Division held that requesting a password is not seeking
evidence, but rather seeking a fact that leads to the evidence.67

63

See G.A.Q.L. v. State, 257 So. 3d 1058, 1061–62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018).
See In re Single-Family Home & Attached Garage, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170184,
at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2017), rev’d on other grounds, In re Search Warrant Application,
279 F. Supp. 3d 800 (N.D. Ill. 2017); accord In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354
F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (stating that “a successful finger or thumb scan
confirms ownership or control of the device.”).
65
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976) (explaining that compliance with a
subpoena “tacitly concedes” the existence of the evidence sought).
66
United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 669 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (quoting Doe
v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 208 n.6 (1988)).
67
See id.
64
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Therefore, providing a password can be a testimonial communication because it leads to other evidence.68
Courts often characterize a password as knowledge, thereby
making it “contents of the mind.”69 This characterization prevents
passwords from being a foregone conclusion and are, therefore, testimonial. In another case, Pollard v. State, the court notes that the
method of providing the password, whether defendant enters it into
the phone, writes it down, or says it, does not negate that it is a product of the defendant’s mind.70
c) Types of Encryption
Some courts distinguish between passwords and biometric decryption.71 These courts assert that using a fingerprint to decrypt a
digital device is merely a physical act and therefore is as good as a
foregone conclusion.72 In contrast, since the government does not
know the password, decryption via password is not a forgone conclusion.73
In Minnesota, the Diamond court argued that the physical act of
providing a fingerprint is no different than other longstanding manners of compelling the suspect to perform a physical act to confirm
or deny his guilt.74 As previously mentioned, there are established
exceptions to the Fifth Amendment, such as allowing for blood
draws or making a court appearance to be identified by the victim.75
The court found that unlocking a phone via fingerprint is no more
testimonial than these longstanding physical exceptions.76

68

See id.
See, e.g., id (quoting Doe, 487 U.S. at 211); Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267,
271 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014).
70
Pollard v. State, 287 So. 3d 639, 653 (Fla. 2019), denied motion for rehearing and
certified questions to 2019 Fla. App. LEXIS 18978 (Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2019).
71
See Baust, 89 Va. Cir. at 271; but see In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 F.
Supp. 3d 1010, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
72
See, e.g., United States v. Barrera, 415 F. Supp. 3d 832, 839 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2019).
73
Baust, 89 Va. Cir. at 271.
74
See State v. Diamond, 890 N.W.2d 143, 151 (Ct. App. Minn. 2017).
75
See supra Section I.B.1.
76
Id.
69
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d) Waiver: Once Revealed, It Is No Longer a Secret
In Vermont, the Boucher court found that if an individual has
already shown files to the government, thereby confirming the existence, location, and authenticity of these files, the Fifth Amendment protection is waived.77 The government’s knowledge of files
that the defendant has already confirmed makes them foregone.78
Boucher complied with a preliminary search of his computer, which
contained child pornography, but later refused to provide the password.79 Since the existence of these files on his computer was already a foregone conclusion, providing the password no longer carried any testimonial value.80 This voluntary production as waiver
has been held to be true even in a case where the defendant was in
custody and had not been given her Miranda rights.81
e) Rejected Distinctions
i. Voluntarily Created Files Can Still Be Testimonial
In an Eleventh Circuit case, the defendant rebutted the government’s argument that files created voluntarily are not testimonial because they were not created to be incriminating.82 The Court held
that the government’s argument missed the issue of whether the act
of production, not the contents, was communicative.83 Here, the
court required the government to show that it had knowledge of

77

In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Boucher), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *9–10 (D.
Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).
78
Id.
79
Id. at 9.
80
Id. at 9–10; Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. 512, 524 (2014) (finding that the
defendant’s post-arrest interview informed the government that his transactions and
communications utilized his computers and affirmed his ownership of the computers,
thereby making any communication from decrypting them a foregone conclusion).
81
United States v. Oloyede, 933 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 2019); but see United States v.
Green, 272 F.3d 748, 753 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that once an individual has invoked his
right to counsel, any subsequent interrogation results in testimonial and inadmissible selfincrimination).
82
United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum), 670 F.3d 1335, 1342
(11th Cir. 2012).
83
Id.
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some of the contents of the device rather than merely knowing that
the defendant can decrypt it.84
ii. Decryption Is Not Assembly
Another rejected distinction is that decryption actually forces the
defendant to assemble the data together for the government.85 Unlike when Hubbell was required to collect thousands of documents,
biometric decryption cannot be considered testimonial by claiming
it is an act of assembly since this process is accomplished by a single
tap of defendant’s finger.86 The U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia found that the difference in cognitive exertion involved
in the assembly process distinguished whether it was testimonial.87
f) Effort Involved May Make a Difference
Similarly to above, the Eleventh Circuit held that a defendant
was not required to produce an unencrypted hard drive.88 The court
found that it was testimonial that rather than seeking decryption of
a device, the government sought to require the defendant to produce
a copy of the unencrypted hard drive.89 A later court noted that producing an unencrypted hard drive is more cognitively demanding
than the act of biometrically decrypting a device, thereby causing
production of an unencrypted hard drive to not be a foregone conclusion.90
g) Scope of Reasonable Particularity
The Hubbell Court considered the government’s request for
“any and all” documents to be an indication that the government did
not have enough knowledge of the defendant’s incriminatory possessions to rise to the level of a foregone conclusion.91 Knowing that
an individual keeps business records is insufficient for showing with

84
United States v. Spencer, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70649, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26,
2018) (interpreting Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 670 F.3d at 1347).
85
In re Search of [Redacted], 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 537–38 (D.D.C. 2018).
86
Id. at 538.
87
Id.
88
See generally Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 670 F.3d.
89
Id. at 1346.
90
State v. Diamond, 890 N.W.2d 143, 150 (Ct. App. Minn. 2017).
91
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 38 (2000).
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reasonable particularity that he has the documents the government
is seeking.92 Such an overbroad statement cannot be the basis for a
foregone conclusion because answering such a request would show
that the defendant believed the documents he produced were actually what the government sought. Compliance with such a request
implicitly communicates the defendant’s belief that these documents reveal their guilt and waive the defendant’s option to deny
knowledge of what the government is seeking.
Other courts have determined that the government’s lack of
specificity for the files it seeks is actually a Fourth Amendment issue,93 while simultaneously noting that “it is nonsensical to ask
whether the government has established with ‘reasonable particularity’ that the defendant is able to decrypt a device.”94 The Spencer
court noted that the reasonable particularity standard is ill-suited for
the yes or no inquiry of whether the defendant can open his phone;
rather, such a standard is more logically tailored to determining if
the government has shown enough prior knowledge to meet its burden of showing the device’s contents are a foregone conclusion not
worthy of the Fifth Amendment’s protection.95
II. A CRY FOR HELP: WHEN DOCTRINE IS MISCONSTRUED

A. Dangerous Interpretations: State v. Stahl
In 2014, the Floridian police arrested Aaron Stahl on charges of
video voyeurism for attempting to capture video footage up a
woman’s skirt with his cell phone.96 When police located and arrested him, he did not have his cell phone on him.97 Once arrested,
he agreed to have his phone searched but then withdrew his consent.98 He had already identified the phone—an iPhone 5—and
92
Doe v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 383 F.3d 905, 911–12 (9th Cir.
2004).
93
United States v. Spencer, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70649, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26,
2018).
94
Id. at 8.
95
Id. at 9.
96
State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
97
Id.
98
Id. at 128.
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confirmed that it could be found at his residence.99 However, when
police discovered the phone was password protected,100 the Fifth
Amendment analysis began, and it went awry.
The Stahl court focused on the testimonial element of the Fifth
Amendment right.101 It found that the production of a password does
not constitute a testimonial communication and therefore, the state
can compel decryption of a password encrypted device.102 Stahl
classifies biometrics as mere physical acts to classify biometric decryption as nontestimonial.103 Such reasoning fails to recognize that
mere physical acts serve to utilize the defendant’s physical qualities
as evidence, rather than having the defendant supply access to evidence.
The Stahl court asserts two lines of reasoning which decrease
the burden of the foregone conclusion doctrine. First, Stahl reduced
the government’s burden to showing independent knowledge of the
existence, authenticity, and possession of the phone’s password, rather than having to show independent knowledge of the evidence
that is encrypted on the phone.104 Second, the court found that if the
foregone conclusion doctrine applies to passwords, the passwords
must be considered self-authenticating, thereby both removing authentication as an element of the doctrine and simultaneously causing the defendant’s act of decryption to be communicative of the
authenticity of the content on the device.105 The Stahl court also
struggled to determine how a password is actually defined within its
abridged version of the doctrine. At different points in the opinion,
the court regarded passwords as a source of evidence,106 but subsequently considered the password to be the evidence that must be
foregone for the government to compel decryption.107 Each of these
problematic findings will be discussed below.

99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Id.
Id.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 136.
Id.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 135–36.
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1. Passwords as Nontestimonial Communications
The Stahl court found that producing a password was a nontestimonial communication.108 The Fifth Amendment privilege only
protects against compulsion of testimonial communications, while
nontestimonial materials can be compelled.109 Therefore, the testimonial status of a password determines whether the Fifth Amendment protects encrypted devices.
Many courts find that something is testimonial if it utilizes the
contents of the individual’s mind.110 But the Stahl court noted that
the Hubbell Court spoke of “extensive” use of the contents of the
mind.111 This led Stahl to assert that the content being sought must
be of “testimonial significance” to be testimonial.112 Therefore, the
Stahl court concluded that because the password being sought does
not alone have testimonial significance, it is a nontestimonial communication.113 This reasoning prevented Stahl from asserting his
Fifth Amendment right, and allowed the government to compel the
unlocking of his iPhone.
The issue with Stahl’s analysis is that it misses the Hubbell
Court’s point of juxtaposing the notion of the “extensive” use of the
contents of the mind with a reiteration of Doe’s famous footnote,
showing that physical keys are different than keys stored in one’s
memory.114 This juxtaposition served to show that extensive usage
of one’s cognitive abilities to collect hundreds of documents is more
similar to being compelled to provide a wall safe combination than
the non-cognitively demanding act of handing over a physical key
to open a box.115 It is a typical and commonplace convention of
speech to follow a conceptual statement with an example to help
108

Id. at 134.
Id. at 131.
110
Id. at 133–34.
111
Id. (quoting United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000)).
112
Id. at 133–34 (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 211 n.10 (1988)).
113
Id. at 133–35.
114
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43 (“It was unquestionably necessary for respondent to make
extensive use of ‘the contents of his own mind’ in identifying the hundreds of documents
responsive to the requests in the subpoena….The assembly of those documents was like
telling an inquisitor the combination to a wall safe, not like being forced to surrender the
key to a strongbox.”).
115
Id.
109
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visualize the content of the preceding sentence. By using Hubbell’s
“extensive usage of the mind” out of context of the subsequent statement, the Stahl court misapplied Hubbell’s case language. Severing
“extensive” from the wall safe combination example attempts to
make producing a password into an insignificant, and thus, nontestimonial communication. At the extreme, this mistaken interpretation permits compelled decryption to be subject to governmental
compulsion like any other type of physical evidence—despite a
password’s existence as contents of the mind.
2. To Be the Evidence or to Provide the Evidence
The Stahl court confuses two important ideas: (1) the defendant’s characteristics being classified as the evidence and (2) the government utilizing the defendant’s physical characteristics as a vehicle to obtaining other evidence.116 In coming to the conclusion that
passwords are nontestimonial, the Stahl court asserts that it is necessary to prevent biometrically encrypted cell phones from receiving less protection under the Fifth Amendment than passwords.117
The court then sought to ensure that neither format of encryption
received Fifth Amendment protection. Their argument hinges on
their assumption that biometric decryption does not convey more
than an unprotected mere physical act.118
Under longstanding Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, an accused
may be forced to do certain physical acts to confirm or deny their
guilt, such as providing blood samples or voice exemplars.119 If
these compelled acts were not permitted under the Fifth Amendment, Justice Holmes noted, a court would not even be allowed to
bring the defendant in to be viewed by a jury.120 However, conflating the physical acts permitted by Fifth Amendment jurisprudence—of being the physical evidence against oneself with

116

Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 135; but see Doe, 487 U.S. at 211 n.10 (utilizing the phrase
“testimonial significance” to explain the distinction between serving as the physical
evidence and physically complying with a compulsion order to provide a source of
evidence).
117
Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 135.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763 (1966).
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biometric decryption—misunderstands the goal of using the defendant as evidence against oneself when there would be no other alternative.
Forcing the defendant to unlock a phone is not about being the
evidence, it is about directly supplying the evidence. This additional
step between being the evidence and personally supplying the evidence, regardless of the format of decryption, results in a testimonial
action “furnish[ing] a link in the chain of evidence.”121 Unless the
ownership and content on the device has already been shown to be
a foregone conclusion through independent means, compelled biometric decryption communicates the defendant’s relationship with
the device and its contents.
In Doe, the government carefully crafted the consent directive
to avoid being testimonial; the directive did not assert any facts by
requesting information on any accounts Doe “may” be associated
with, without specifying from which bank, and by adding the additional layer of protection of requiring independent authentication.122
The Doe defendant was not revealing possession with this signature;
rather the signature served to allow the government to obtain access
to documents from a third-party that may result in relevant evidence,
which the government would subsequently have to authenticate independently.123 This distinguishes Doe’s physical act of signing the
directive from the direct and personal surrender of evidence provided by biometric decryption, which communicates that the evidence on the device was placed there by the individual with matching physical features.124
It is important to note that the above analysis is not applicable if
the government already knew the phone contained illicit content and
had probable cause to believe the suspect had committed the crime.

121

United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 38 (2000) (quoting Hoffman v. United States,
341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)) (“‘The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would
in themselves support a conviction…but likewise embraces those which would furnish a
link in the chain of evidence.’”).
122
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 215 (1988).
123
Id.
124
Aric Jenkins, Could an ‘Evil Twin’ Trick Your iPhone’s Facial Recognition?, TIME
(Sept. 13, 2017), https://time.com/4940176/apple-iphone-x-face-id-facial-recognition/
[https://perma.cc/Q89G-5MDH].
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If biometric decryption served to merely confirm ownership over the
device, then compelled biometric decryption would be the same as
being classified as physical evidence against oneself.
3. Reducing the Foregone Conclusion Burden
The Stahl court diminished the foregone conclusion doctrine to
only require the government to prove with reasonable particularity
that a password exists, the password is within the defendant’s control, and it is authentic.125 Stahl’s focus is on the vessel, the device
holding the evidence, but the Fifth Amendment’s protection is for
protecting the defendant from having to produce their own self-incriminating evidence. The foregone conclusion was established for
the limited circumstances in which the government can independently show it already knew of the evidence in the defendant’s
possession,126 not that the defendant has access to a source of potential evidence.
The Stahl court accomplished this outrageous misreading of the
foregone conclusion doctrine by misunderstanding the circumstances in Boucher,127 where the defendant voluntarily allowed the
government to search and discover child pornography on his computer and, therefore, made his possession of illicit content a foregone
conclusion.128 The government’s previous search of the contents of
the computer acts as independent knowledge of the device’s content,
making the illicit content a foregone conclusion and nullifying the
testimonial nature of providing the password to the computer.
Boucher is easily distinguishable from Stahl, where the government was attempting to access Stahl’s phone to try and prove he in
fact committed a crime.129 Knowing Boucher’s encrypted computer
contains child pornography is different than knowing that Stahl’s
phone is password encrypted. The officers investigating Stahl did
not have any independent means for knowing the contents of his
phone and wanted access to its decrypted files to obtain the initial
125

State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
Doe v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 383 F.3d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 2004).
127
Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 136.
128
In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Boucher), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *9 (D. Vt.
Feb. 19, 2009).
129
Compare Boucher, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *9, with Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 127.
126
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evidence.130 By only requiring proof that Stahl has the password to
his own phone, the Stahl court drastically reduced the government’s
burden envisioned by the Hubbell Court for the foregone conclusion
doctrine.131
Comparing Stahl to Hubbell, the Hubbell Court held that the
government’s overbroad demand for thousands of documents
showed that the government had not met its burden for the foregone
conclusion exception to the production of self-incriminating evidence.132 A sweeping compulsion of business records, without any
specificity, evidences that the government failed to independently
identify what they were seeking from Hubbell.
The government did not want Stahl’s password for the sake of
knowing the password; the password served as a vehicle to a potential avenue for evidence. When the Stahl court held that if the government can prove that the defendant has the password to his phone
then the password is a foregone conclusion, this is the equivalent of
saying that if the government knew Hubbell owned papers then all
of his papers were a foregone conclusion to be freely collected by
the government. The Supreme Court held the opposite by invalidating a claim for the foregone conclusion doctrine because the overbroad demand signified the government’s inability to articulate
which documents they wanted.133
4. Removing Elements of the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine
The Stahl decision removes the authenticity element from the
foregone conclusion doctrine by determining that passcodes are selfauthenticating.134 According to Stahl, if the government, with
130

See generally Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 127.
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 45; Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 135 (contradicting
itself, having stated the correct burden of proof at the beginning of the opinion: “However,
even the testimonial communication implicit in the act of production does not rise ‘to the
level of testimony within the protection of the Fifth Amendment’ where the State has
established, through independent means, the existence, possession, and authenticity of the
documents.”).
132
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 45.
133
Id. (“The Government cannot cure this deficiency through the overbroad argument
that a businessman such as respondent will always possess general business and tax records
that fall within the broad categories described in this subpoena.”).
134
Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 136.
131
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reasonable particularity, determines a device belongs to the defendant and a password exists that the defendant can unlock the device
with, then the contents of the device are authentic. This reduces the
government’s burden for the foregone conclusion exception to the
Fifth Amendment; it only needs to prove the existence and location
elements.
Additionally, determining a password’s authenticity based on
whether or not it opens the device is backwards;135 such a process
forces the defendant to authenticate the password him/herself by
showing the password opens the device.136 Not only does this selfauthenticating test137 appear to remove an element of the foregone
conclusion doctrine, but it actually makes the action of entering the
password retroactively communicative (of its own authenticity), and
therefore testimonial, as it provides the government with information they did not know before (that the password is authentic).138
Furthermore, authenticity is a distinct rule of the admissibility of
evidence and acts as a potential defense for criminal defendants that
should not be eradicated.139
5. Inconsistent Usage of Passwords as Two Separate Things
Finally, the Stahl court simultaneously considered a password to
be two opposing concepts. Earlier in the decision, the password is
merely a means to evidence and therefore, it is non-testimonial because it is insignificant.140 Later in the decision, the court argues under the assumption that the password is evidence.141 For the
135

Id. (“If the phone or computer is accessible once the passcode or key has been entered,
the passcode or key is authentic.”).
136
Pollard v. State, 287 So. 3d 649, 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019); People v. Spicer, 125
N.E.3d 1286, 1292 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019).
137
Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 136.
138
Spicer, 125 N.E.3d at 1292.
139
FED. R. EVID. 901 & 902; FLA. STAT § 90.901 (2012).
140
Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 134 (“[A]lthough the passcode would allow the State access to
the phone, and therefore to a source of potential evidence, the State has a warrant to search
the phone—the source of evidence had already been uncovered.”).
141
Id. at 135–36 (“That is, by implicitly admitting the existence of the evidence requested
and that it is in the accused’s possession the accused ‘adds little or nothing to the sum total
of the Government’s information’” and “[t]o know whether providing the passcode implies
testimony that is a foregone conclusion, the relevant question is whether the State has
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purposes of the foregone conclusion, it is essential that the court resolve this inconsistency by acknowledging that a password is rarely
itself evidence, but rather a method of access to evidence.
The Stahl court risks the integrity of the foregone conclusion
doctrine and the protections of the Fifth Amendment with its erroneous reasoning and findings. Providing a password is a testimonial
communication as it utilizes contents of the mind to decrypt a digital
device and is not a mere surrender. Biometric decryption is not the
same as physical acts of being the evidence against one’s self. To
utilize the foregone conclusion doctrine, the government must carry
its burden of independent knowledge of the data it seeks from the
device it wants decrypted. The defendant’s successful decryption of
a device cannot retroactively authenticate the content of the device.
Ultimately, passwords are not evidence themselves, but rather they
are a link to a source of evidence.
B. Stahl’s Progeny
1. When Stahl’s Holding Traveled Beyond the Floridian
Borders
While some courts are not convinced by Stahl’s abridged version of the foregone conclusion doctrine,142 other courts are employing it.143 The Stahl holding and its reasoning has permeated Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence in several states.
In State v. Andrews, the New Jersey court used Stahl’s abridged
foregone conclusion doctrine as support for its statements that

established that it knows with reasonable particularity that the passcode exists, is within
the accused’s possession or control, and is authentic.”).
142
G.A.Q.L. v. State, 257 So. 3d 1058, 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (disagreeing with
its sister court of appeals that the foregone conclusion is strictly for getting the contents of
the phone, not the password); Pollard v. State, 287 So. 3d 649, 651 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
June 20, 2019), review dismissed and motion denied as moot by No. SC20-110, 2020 Fla.
LEXIS 522, at *1 (Mar. 25, 2020) (noting that the government has to carry its burden for
the foregone conclusion exception before it unlocks the phone, which means authenticity
cannot be proven afterwards by showing the phone opens when defendant puts his
password in); Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952, 970 (Ind. 2020).
143
State v. Andrews, 457 N.J. Super. 14, 27 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018); State v.
Johnson, 576 S.W.3d 205, 226 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019); State v. Pittman, 300 Or. App. 147,
161–62 (2019); Commonwealth v. Jones, 481 Mass. 540, 548 (2019).
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providing a password does not constitute a testimonial communication because the government already knows the password exists and
the government only needs to show that the defendant has the password to his device.144 On appeal to New Jersey’s Supreme Court,
Andrews once again leaned on Stahl’s reasoning for support145 citing
Stahl for two components of its abridged approach to the foregone
conclusion doctrine: 1) the government’s knowledge with reasonable particularity of the existence and defendant’s possession of the
password, as opposed to focusing on the evidence sought from the
device;146 and 2) Stahl’s declaration that, for digital devices, the authenticity prong of the foregone conclusion doctrine should be assumed.147
Aside from fostering other New Jersey cases,148 Andrews’ holding has since been used as support in a Missouri case,149 and is mentioned in an Ohio case,150 spreading the influence of Stahl’s holding
further. Oregon takes it a step further, drastically abridging the Fifth
Amendment by disregarding the elements of the foregone conclusion doctrine altogether.151
2. Scary New Trends as Stahl’s Reasoning Continues to
Spread
The scary reality of Stahl’s holding is exacerbated when subsequent courts loosen the doctrine even further. In State v. Pittman,
the defendant appealed a contempt order from her refusal to provide
her phone password in relation to an investigation of defendant’s
144

Andrews, 457 N.J. Super. at 27, 29.
State v. Andrews, 243 N.J. 447, 475–76 (2020).
146
Id.
147
Id. at 481.
148
In re State’s Application, No. A-4509-18T2, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1708,
at *8 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 11, 2020) (applying Andrews’ foregone conclusion
doctrine by showing that Max owned the phone, the phone was password protected because
the state could not open it, and the password self-authenticates); State v. Anthony, No. A0714-19T4, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1737, at *1–2 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 18,
2020).
149
State v. Johnson, 576 S.W.3d 205, 227–28 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S.
Ct. 472, 205 L. Ed. 2d 286, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 6651 (U.S. 2019).
150
In re M.W., 2018-Ohio-5227, ¶¶ 60–63 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018).
151
State v. Pittman, 300 Or. App. 147, 149 (2019), rev’d and remanded on different
grounds by State v. Pittman, 376 Ore. 498 (2021).
145
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involvement in a single-vehicle accident with a tree.152 The government sought to compel the defendant to open her phone to acquire
evidence that the defendant was under the influence of an illicit substance when she was involved in the accident.153 Pittman was held
in contempt of court for entering her password wrong twice.154
Pittman utilized Stahl’s holding that passwords are nontestimonial to abandon the foregone conclusion doctrine when compelling
decryption of a device that the government had already lawfully
seized by warrant.155 The court stated that the government’s possession of the device is the equivalent of the government’s possession
of the data on the device, despite its encrypted format.156 Neither the
Court of Appeals of Oregon,157 nor the Supreme Court of Oregon158
attempts to employ the elements of the foregone conclusion doctrine.
Further, the Supreme Court of Oregon established precedent that
the State can waive the testimonial aspects of decrypting a device
without first requiring the State to show prior knowledge of the contents of the device.159 The court accomplished this by allowing the
state to “not use defendant’s act of unlocking the phone as evidence;
[the State] would only use it to gain access to the phone.”160 This is
contrary to Fisher’s finding that the existence of, and access to, evidence is testimonial in and of itself.161 According to Pittman the
“testimonial aspects of the act have constitutional significance,

152

Pittman, 300 Or. App. at 149.
Id. at 150.
154
Id. at 151–52.
155
Id. at 161 (“The state did not need to establish, however, that the contents of the
iPhone were a foregone conclusion.”).
156
Id.
157
See generally Pittman, 300 Or. App.
158
See generally State v. Pittman, 376 Or. 498 (2021).
159
Id. at 523–26 (“[T]he state informed the court that it would not use defendant’s act of
unlocking the phone as evidence; it would use it only to gain access to the phone…[we]
permit an order compelling a defendant to unlock a cell phone so long as the state…is
prohibited from using defendant’s act against defendant, except to obtain access to the
contents of the phone.”).
160
Id. at 523–24.
161
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976) (“Surely the Government is in no
way relying on the “truthtelling” of the taxpayer to prove the existence of or his access to
the documents.”).
153
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which we must address; the access that the act provides does not.”162
This reasoning ignores the fact that if the government does not have
prior knowledge of the existence of the evidence, then the evidence
itself becomes testimonial by communicating its own existence.
The existence of the evidence and the defendant’s access to it
are communicative of a relationship between the evidence on the
digital device and the defendant.163 The Fisher Court allowed the
government to demand the production of the tax documents because
the government already knew these documents existed in the possession of a third-party, the defendants’ attorneys.164 Pittman correctly asserts that the evidence is not protected165 but the Pittman
court is wrong to think the government can waive the testimonial
nature of opening the device to provide evidence the government
did not previously know of. Without prior governmental knowledge
of the existence of the evidence, the evidence’s own existence is testimonial as it speaks against its owner and communicates the defendant’s access to it. Therefore, the existence of the evidence
should be protected until the government can show knowledge that
the evidence’s existence is a foregone conclusion. The existence, the
access, the relationship between defendant and the evidence, etc.166
are the communicative and testimonial aspects that the foregone
conclusion element exists to protect.
The Pittman case further demonstrates the delicate nature of formulating exceptions to constitutional rights. Any concessions are
likely to be further loosened over time, whether by the development
of new circumstances or by misinterpretations in the applicability of
the exception. And when the doctrine is loose enough, the courts
may discard it altogether. For the viability of constitutional rights
over time it is vital that exceptions to the rule be narrowly construed.
The manner in which Stahl and its progeny flippantly turn over all

162

Pittman, 376 Or. at 525.
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (“The act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena
nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the
papers produced. Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the
papers demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer.”).
164
Id. at 411.
165
Pittman, 376 Or. at 525.
166
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410.
163
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encrypted digital devices does injustice to the careful protections
that have surrounded the Fifth Amendment for years.167
The compulsion orders themselves are likely to lead to novel
complications.168 If suspects claim that they do not know or cannot
remember their passwords, courts will have to consider when to
punish the individuals for defying a compulsion order.169 It would
be a miscarriage of justice if individuals were held in contempt for
genuinely not knowing a password. If the penalty for being held in
contempt is less than the sentence for the crime the defendant is accused of, the defendant may engage in a cost-benefit analysis and
strategically choose non-compliance.170 The government must then
show that the defendant willfully refused to comply or else the defendant may avoid any consequence for their noncompliance.171
This could push courts and legislatures to escalate the penalty for
being held in contempt. But it will be a struggle for the courts to
determine whether the defendant was willfully noncompliant. The
court sought to hold the Pittman defendant in contempt for providing the wrong password to the device and chose not to provide a
written discussion of how it determined that Pittman was willful in
her noncompliance.172
Further, hasty application of exceptions to constitutional rights
will subject criminal defendants to arbitrary differences in their
rights. The distinction between biometrics and alphanumeric passwords is particularly inconspicuous to lay people who will not realize that their legal rights change based on how they encrypt their
devices. The recent court cases about compelled biometric

167

See Commonwealth v. Jones, 481 Mass. 540, 547 (2019) (Lenk, J., concurring); see
also Pollard v. State, 287 So. 3d 649, 653–54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (questioning Stahl’s
reasoning for the sake of individual autonomy, concerns of governmental overreach, and
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decryption have been discussed by technology news outlets.173 It
seems unfair to reward people under the law with their Fifth Amendment right for having access to legal news, following technologyrelated news, or for their preference on how to decrypt their device.
Such a nuanced distinction is unfair. It creates inequitable results for
criminal defendants that do not know that biometric decryption
means their bodies can be used against them if the government wants
access to their device. Many mobile phones,174 tablets,175 and some
personal computers176 are equipped with biometric decryption technology. This problem will only get worse as newer formats of decryption arise—leading to unpredictable results.
3. Scholarly Considerations for Finding a Solution
Scholars have offered their opinions on how to resolve the ambiguities in the applicability of Fisher’s foregone conclusion doctrine to compelled decryption. There is some consensus that the government cannot compel the defendant to write down or orally provide their password to an encrypted device.177 Being compelled to
provide the password orally or in written format would force a criminal defendant to reveal the contents of his or her mind.178 Additionally, the foregone conclusion doctrine is built upon the act of producing something that was voluntarily created by the defendant
173

See Lily Hay Newman, Why Cops Can Force You to Unlock Your Phone with Your
Face, WIRED (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/police-unlock-iphone-face-idlegal-rights/ [https://perma.cc/Q8XH-HAZB].
174 GLOBAL NEWSWIRE, Global Consumer Biometrics Market Research Report 2020-2025
(Mar.
18,
2020),
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/03/18/
2002724/0/en/global-consumer-biometrics-market-research-report-2020-2025.html
[https://perma.cc/3TP6-UQLE] (“According to the Credit Suisse report, in 2018, the
shipment of smartphones with fingerprint sensors worldwide stood at 1,082 million
units.”).
175 See Xiomara Bianco, Best Tablets with Fingerprint Sensors, CNET (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://www.cnet.com/news/best-tablets-with-fingerprint-sensors/ [https://perma.cc/9JZ7ZE6N].
176 See David Nield, How to Log into Your Computer with Your Fingerprint or Face,
POPULAR SCI. (Apr. 24, 2018),
https://www.popsci.com/computer-loginfingerprint-face/ [https://perma.cc/96YA-6P7N].
177
Laurent Sacharoff, What Am I Really Saying When I Open My Smartphone? A
Response to Orin S. Kerr, 97 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 64 (2019) [hereinafter What Am I
Really Saying].
178
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prior to the government’s involvement, preexisting the compulsion,
rather than writing something down in response to the compulsion.179 The question remains: can a court compel the criminal defendant to enter the password into the device to decrypt it?180
In such circumstances, the defendant does not reveal the password
but decrypts the device and provides the decrypted device to the
government to search.181
First it must be determined what the act of decryption communicates.182 While some scholars feel that decryption only reveals the
defendant’s knowledge of the password, others argue that decryption potentially communicates the defendant’s dominion and ownership of the device and their knowing possession of the files on the
device.183 This point of contention is at the center of the issue of
applying the foregone conclusion doctrine.184
Professor Laurent Sacharoff of the University of Arkansas
School of Law points out that Doe would consider production to be
testimonial for “implicit statements of fact.”185 This requires us to
consider all the potential inferences that come from requiring a defendant to decrypt his or her device, including knowledge, possession of the device and its files, and authenticity.186 According to Sacharoff, if decryption only reveals knowledge of the password, then
for the decryption to be a foregone conclusion, the government need
only show that the defendant knows the password.187 However, if
decryption reveals ownership of the device or possession of the files,
then the government must first reveal independent knowledge of the
files it seeks from the device.188 Since the password is never
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Laurent Sacharoff, Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and Encrypted
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produced and provided to the government because it is contents of
the mind, the password itself cannot be the thing that is foregone.189
Some scholars feel the Fifth Amendment analysis here is altogether misplaced. If not, Professor Orin Kerr argues, then the Fifth
Amendment protections provide an elevated protection, in comparison to Fourth Amendment protections, to defendants who encrypt
their devices.190 Kerr notes that once law enforcement obtains a warrant to search a house, they can search the house and the same should
be true of digital devices.191 Kerr advocates for a bright line rule that
if the government can show that the defendant knows the password
to the decrypted device and that they have the device and a court
order, the defendant should not be able to assert a Fifth Amendment
privilege.192 This will prevent criminal defendants from hindering
the effects of a search warrant by hiding behind a password.193 Kerr
feels that encryption technology is not an appropriate place for Fifth
Amendment rules to apply because these rules will act as barriers on
top of the Fourth Amendment protections already in place.194
Some scholars take a different approach: rather than pitting the
value of one amendment against the other, we need to consider compelled decryption of a device seized by a warrant as a hybrid Fourth
and Fifth Amendment question requiring its own unique analysis.195
This approach would only allow the state to retrieve the specific files
that they can describe with reasonable particularity prior to the defendant’s compelled decryption.196
Some scholars are starting to take the view that perhaps such a
flippant disregard for biometric encryption misses some important
considerations.197 The act of biometric decryption communicates the
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defendant’s sole ownership and dominion over the device as well as
exclusive control and ownership of the files on the device.198
III. SOLUTIONS FOR THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: SETTING BOUNDARIES FOR THE
FOREGONE CONCLUSION DOCTRINE

A. Stop Stahl-ing: The Future of the Fifth Amendment
Ideally, legislature should establish guidelines to provide the
proper balance of protecting criminal defendants from compelled
decryption in the scenarios where the act of decryption retains its
testimonial nature and is not a foregone conclusion. However, in the
absence of such efforts, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari
to the next case on topic to clarify the doctrine.
1. Take a Case-by-Case Approach
It must be determined what the act of decryption communicates.
Realistically, the act of decryption communicates different things in
different scenarios. As Professor Sacharoff points out this may depend upon what the government is looking to gain from the compelled decryption.199 A different analysis may be necessary when
the government knows the digital device has been used for illegal
activity and seeks to confirm ownership; or when the government is
seeking evidence from the device; or when the government is seeking content on the device to lead to a different source of evidence.
A case-by-case approach is superior to Professor Kerr’s suggestion for a bright line rule because the foregone conclusion may apply
differently in different scenarios. Kerr’s recommendation for a
bright line rule rests on his assertion that unlocking a device only
implicitly communicates knowledge of the password.200 This disregards the other testimonial qualities of decryption such as dominion
over the phone, ownership of the files on the phone and the authenticity of the files.201 Stahl’s assertion that passwords are self-
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What Am I Really Saying, supra note 179, at 67.
Kerr, supra note 192, at 779.
What Am I Really Saying, supra note 179, at 67.
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authenticating202 is an indication that the courts will utilize the password’s entry to communicate more than mere knowledge of the
password. Cases may occur where decryption of the password will
only reveal knowledge of the password. However, a one-size fits all
approach misses the mark of preventing criminal defendants from
having to provide testimony against themselves.
2. Passwords Are Vehicles, They Are Not the Foregone
Evidence
The Court should find that passwords are not evidence but rather
a means to obtain the evidence. The foregone conclusion should not
apply to passwords because it is not the evidence the government
seeks.203 The concept of passwords is not new to Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence. Both the Doe204 and Hubbell205 cases acknowledged
passwords can come between the government and evidence but felt
that while physical keys can be surrendered, cognitively memorized
combinations cannot be compelled. The holding in Hubbell turned
on the fact that the government could not independently state what
papers it sought.206 The Court felt the government should have provided a specific demand, guiding the defendant to the documents
they sought, to show they already knew of these documents to warrant their surrender.207 The foregone conclusion doctrine is supposed to apply to evidence that the government already knows
about, thereby removing the sting of compelling the defendant to
provide it to the government. If the government merely has to know
that the defendant has the password to their own phone in order to
be able to compel him/her to provide it so they can search for evidence, that is likely to leave quite the sting.
This protection is especially important for crimes where possession of certain digital content is an element of the crime, as opposed
to when the government is seeking evidence that helps investigate a
different crime. For crimes where possession of digital content is an
202
203
204
205
206
207

State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
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element of a crime, the foregone conclusion exception must be used
even more stringently and only once the government can show, from
an independent source, that the defendant is guilty. Perhaps for such
crimes, compelling the individual to open their phone should only
be used for sentencing purposes.
3. Criminal Defendants Are Entitled to the Proper
Functioning of Both the Fourth & Fifth Amendment
The boundaries of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment should not
be blurred. While the Fourth Amendment is concerned with privacy,208 the Fifth Amendment is concerned with avoiding compulsion leading to the cruel trilemma.209 Despite the challenges of obtaining evidence in modern society and for modern crimes, the autonomy to not be coerced to implicitly say “I did it” by actions is not
merely an added inconvenience to Fourth Amendment searches.
Careful consideration of, among other things, all the possible testimonial qualities that can be expressed, the way data is stored, the
types of information that can be stored without the user’s
knowledge, and the evidentiary methods by which files can be authenticated and assigned to the users, is necessary to determine the
impact of new technology on the doctrine’s application to the rights
of criminal defendants. Fifth Amendment protections must prevail
as long as the compelled action provides any testimony. Therefore,
compelled decryption must be subject to the extra burden of the elements of the foregone conclusion doctrine. Professor Kerr and Professor Sacharoff diverged on the topic of how these two amendments are both at work.
a) Taking the Fourth Amendment Too Far
Professor Kerr argues that if the government can show that the
suspect knows their password, then there should be no Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled decryption.210 Kerr reasons that
defendants should not be permitted to employ the Fifth Amendment
as an additional burden to the government’s Fourth Amendment
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Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976).
Id.; Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596–97 (1990).
Kerr, supra note 192, at 783.
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burdens of finding probable cause and acquiring a search warrant.211
Kerr states that if the government can show that the phone is in the
defendant’s possession and the phone responds to a phone number
known to belong to the defendant, then the foregone conclusion
should apply.212
This does not reach the level of particularity that the Supreme
Court has utilized in prior Fifth Amendment cases considering the
testimoniality of producing incriminating evidence. So far, the three
Supreme Court cases on point consist of two occasions where the
government acquired the documents they sought from a third
party,213 and therefore, did not require the defendant to provide evidence against himself, and more recently, where the Court decided
not to expand the doctrine to avoid governmental overreach when
they could not specify what evidence they wanted.214 The government must therefore, carry a heavier burden than showing the defendant possessed the digital device.
One way to think about the divide between the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment in the context of compelled production is the difference
between the government’s right to take and the right to demand the
defendant to provide. If the government has probable cause and can
obtain a proper warrant, they are entitled to take possession of, or
seize, and search according to the parameters set forth on the warrant.215 But this is entirely distinct from what the government can
demand the defendant to provide. The government is not prohibited
per se from demanding evidence from the defendant, but the government is limited from demanding anything that is testimonial or
would provide the government with more than what they previously
had.216 This is tricky because the evidence itself is not protected,217
it is the potential communication that is communicated when
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providing the evidence that is protected for its testimonial potential.218 The foregone conclusion doctrine arose to shrink this protection in instances when the production of the demanded evidence
would not be testimonial.219 This prevents the defendant from protecting evidence once the government already has some level of
knowledge from an independent source that the evidence exists.220
Herein lies the value of the elements of the foregone conclusion
doctrine. The government should not be able to guess that evidence
is likely to exist and demand it. For the government to assert that the
defendant must provide self-incriminating evidence against their
will, the government must carry the burden of showing they knew
of this evidence anyway.221 This reduces the sting of being forced to
testify against yourself; the government already knew you had this
evidence, so providing it minimizes what you must do against your
free will.
Kerr’s comparison to the law enforcement officers that have a
search warrant to search a house therefore does not work.222 He
never asserts that encrypting one’s digital devices is wrong or illegal
in any way.223 If people can encrypt their devices, then even if this
seems like a nuisance on top of the Fourth Amendment, the ability
to decrypt digital devices is merely a consequence of the advancement of technology. And while encryption is utilized for privacy
purposes, and therefore, would seem at first blush to be a Fourth
Amendment problem,224 the modern reality is that this is something
the government has to demand from the defendant. Being that the
act of decryption can be communicative, this brings in the Fifth
Amendment.225 Decryption creates a practical and legal wedge between the government’s possession of the device and the government’s possession of the data on the device. This is true despite the
fact that if encryption did not exist, then the government would not
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need the defendant’s assistance. Perhaps if encryption did not exist,
people would not utilize their devices the same way and such evidence would not exist.
Additionally, Kerr’s approach does not consider the full potential for “implicit statements of fact” that decryption might convey,
aside from knowledge of the password.226 Decryption also implies
dominion over and possession of the device as well as access and
possibly ownership over the evidence on the device.227 These implications make decryption testimonial,228 which makes it important to
examine every situation individually and consider all possible implications. The protections of the Fifth Amendment must apply if
decryption communicates something that the government did not
previously know.
b) Restricting the Fourth Amendment Too Much
Professor Sacharoff’s approach, by contrast, shortchanges the
Fourth Amendment. He recommends that in compelled decryption
cases, a potential solution against overbroad requests would be to
limit the defendant’s compelled decryption of the device to only provide the government access to the specific files the government can
independently describe with reasonable particularity.229 According
to Sacharoff, this hybrid approach harmonizes the values of both the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments rather than pitting them against each
other.230 Sacharoff acknowledges that this approach suffers shortcomings related to sentencing for possession-based crimes231 but
notes that it offers definite Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections
through its “antifishing” limitations.232
Using the foregone conclusion doctrine to limit governmental
access to only specific files is expanding the reasonable particularity
226
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standard too far by requiring too much specificity. This is true because Sacharoff’s proposal limits the government’s ability to acquire evidence to the specific files that it must already know of.233
Fisher permitted the government to request documents as unspecified as “[r]etained copies of reports and other correspondence between Tannebaum Bindler & Lewis and Dr. E. J. Mason during
1969, 1970 and 1971.”234 While some of the documents demanded
in Fisher were referred to specifically, the above-quoted demand
lacks specificity on what “reports and other correspondences” might
refer to other than a footnote that narrowed this demand to “original
letters sent from the accountant to the taxpayer.”235 This demand
lacks specificity and is capable of referring to a small range of content, rather than one specific document, which shows that Fisher did
not expect the foregone conclusion doctrine to limit the government
in such an exacting manner.
Sacharoff’s approach will not work for all the situations in which
such compulsion orders can arise. The government could be seeking
pictures saved to or created on the device, an audio clip from a
longer recording, documents created or downloaded on the device
or sections of a document, text messages, phone call history, social
media access, browsing history, other internet engagement information,
global
positioning
system
information,
etc.
Alternatively, the government could be seeking to determine if the
defendant deleted files, whether the device utilizes a certain application or program, or how many times the defendant accessed a certain application or program. The government may seek metadata,
which has to be handled delicately because metadata is easily altered
through normal usage of the device or retrieval of files.236 For some
of these potential types of evidence, it is not a specific file that the
government seeks. It could be the data about the file, the lack of the
file, only a selected portion of the file, information about the applications or programs on the device, etc. In such circumstances, a rule
233
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that requires the government to have specific knowledge to describe
a file may place information off-limits to the government in a way
that Fisher is not likely to have intended.
This approach also does not explain the extent to which the government must be able to describe the file it seeks. How would a situation be handled if the government has a witness that saw an illicit
photo of a child on the defendant’s device, but upon opening the
device, the defendant has multiple photos that fit the description?
The question then becomes which photo does the government get.
Sacharoff’s approach is oversimplified and would prove clunky in
practice.
Additionally, while the desire to protect against overzealous forensic investigations is appreciable, the Fifth Amendment is not the
right “place” for these concerns. This approach risks conflating the
values of two amendments. The Fifth Amendment is not supposed
to prevent fishing expeditions, as the Fifth Amendment does not
protect privacy or evidence.237 The Fifth Amendment protects
against the testimonial nature of producing evidence.238 The Fourth
Amendment is supposed to manage privacy concerns by limiting the
government’s search of a seized device as prescribed by the search
warrant.239 When the privacy amendment itself is inadequate to prevent governmental fishing expeditions240 another amendment cannot solve the problem. Once the foregone conclusion applies by the
government’s showing of independent knowledge, by reasonable
particularity, of the files it seeks from the device, it is up to the protections of the Fourth Amendment to take over and limit the search
to what is outlined on the search warrant. This is where Kerr’s house
comparison comes in;241 once the government has access, we must
trust that they will abide by the warrant. The Fifth Amendment is
not a guardian to prevent abuses of the Fourth Amendment.
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4. Define the Standard of the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine
The Supreme Court needs to clarify what the reasonable particularity standard applies to. Aside from the lack of clarity regarding
the level of certainty required to show reasonable particularity, it is
also unclear what the government must show this standard in relation to. Reasonable particularity could apply to how specifically the
government must be able to describe the evidence that it is seeking.242 Alternatively, reasonable particularity could refer to the government’s level of certainty of the existence, location, and authenticity of the evidence it seeks.243
The reasonable particularity standard should apply to the government’s ability to show, with some level of certainty, their prior
knowledge that relevant evidence exists. Requiring the government
to be too specific in describing the evidence they are seeking will
lead to a rule that is only applicable in some circumstances.244 In
Fisher, the government knew the types of documents they sought
but they did not know enough to specifically describe each individual document.245 If the level of specificity with which the government must demand particular pieces of evidence is too high, then the
doctrine will lose its value to the government. Since the evidence
itself is not protected, they need not already know the specifics of
what the evidence will provide, but the government must know that
it is exists, its location, and that it is authentic.
Considering this issue from the opposite perspective, in Stahl’s
case, the government would have easily been able to describe what
they expected to find on his iPhone by the nature of the crime he
was accused of.246 They were seeking files showing that he took inappropriate video and/or photographic content of a female customer
in a store because that is the crime he was accused of.247 In order
for the government’s burden to have any meaning under such
242
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circumstances, the government must show their investigative work
provided them with some level of independent prior knowledge of
the existence, location, and authenticity of the evidence they seek.
5. Clarify the Elements of the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine
The Supreme Court should also clarify whether or not possession falls within the elements of the foregone conclusion. Some
courts have used possession as interchangeable with the location element.248 This confusion stems from the fact that Fisher lists three
ways the act of production could be communicative: (1) by admitting possession, (2) control, and (3) the existence of the produced
items.249 However, subsequent courts have confused these three
communicative aspects of production with the three elements the
government must show to carry its burden for application of the
foregone conclusion doctrine: (1) existence, (2) location, and (3) authenticity.250
Possession, or more precisely dominion, should only be a component of the locational element. If the government cannot independently show that the defendant has some level of control over the
device, then the government cannot threaten a contempt order to
force defendant to open the device. However, this is not the sole
burden of the location element; the government cannot merely state
that they believe evidence to be “on defendant’s digital device.” The
government retains the responsibility of producing some other information to prove that they have prior independent knowledge that
a specified location on the device contains the evidence that government already knows, with reasonable particularity, to exist on the
device. The locational element of the foregone conclusion carries
the potential to be the proper place to address the “antifishing”
Fourth Amendment concern251 expressed by some scholars. A well
outlined search warrant stating precisely how the device will be
searched could constitute the locational element of the foregone
conclusion doctrine and be the mechanism for harmonizing the
248
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Fourth and Fifth Amendment without losing the values behind either
of them.
6. Protect the Authenticity Element of the Foregone
Conclusion Doctrine
The Supreme Court should call out Stahl’s rejection of the need
to authenticate digital content. If the password self-authenticates the
contents of the device, then providing the password becomes testimonial by communicating the authenticity of the contents of the device.252 To maintain Stahl’s self-authenticating password proposal,
the government would have to independently prove authenticity of
the content on the device prior to compelling the defendant to decrypt the device.253 While authenticity has a low standard254 as its
“burden of proof is slight,”255 authenticity should still be a valid evidentiary objection for defendants.
B. Biometrics Are Not Physical Acts, They Are Passwords!
Biometric decryption has taken a hard hit in modern Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence.256 However, the Supreme Court should
contemplate the value of considering all encryption formats the
same. The fact that biometrics are not contents of the mind does not
mean biometric decryption cannot be testimonial.
It seems arbitrary and inequitable that an exception to the Fifth
Amendment which prevents an individual from being compelled to
unlock their device is afforded to those who use an alphanumeric
passcode but not to those who use face ID or fingerprints to encrypt
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their devices. Creating a Fifth Amendment distinction based on the
format of decryption will create inequitable results for defendants
that do not know that biometric decryption means their bodies can
be used against them if the government wants access to their device.
If no bright line rule is established on this matter, newer formats
of encryption will lead to unpredictable holdings. What about unlock patterns?257 Unlock patterns represent both physical gestures
and the memory of the user. Figuring out whether such a decryption
method is a mental exercise or a physical action would be a waste
of court time. With rapid technological advancements, we do not
know what will come next. The legal system should strive to encourage innovation of technology rather than stifling it with the fear
that new technology will expose individuals to differential rights. “It
has been repeatedly decided that [the Fifth Amendment] should receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment.”258
Moreover, one of Doe’s subtler footnotes paves the groundwork
for understanding the difference between physical acts of being the
evidence and being compelled to perform actions that leads to evidence.259 Decrypting a device regardless of format is an additional
step towards providing evidence against oneself. A defendant
should not be compelled to provide the government with access to
self-incriminating evidence unless it is actually a foregone conclusion. Therefore, the Court should distinguish decryption by biometrics from the physical acts of actually being the evidence, such as by
providing blood samples or voice exemplars.260
Furthermore, in Matter of Residence of Oakland,261 the court
noted that biometrics are functionally the same as passwords
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An unlock pattern requires tracing a prespecified number of points which forms a
pattern that unlocks the device.
258
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 417 (1976) (quoting Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921)).
259
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 211 n.10 (1988) (“[T]he Court distinguished
between the suspect’s being compelled himself to serve as evidence and the suspect’s being
compelled to disclose or communicate information or facts that might serve as or lead to
incriminating evidence.”).
260
See State v. Diamond, 890 N.W.2d 143, 150 (Ct. App. Minn. 2017).
261
In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
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because various security features of most cell phones can render biometric access functionless, necessitating password entry to open
the device.262 While providing fingerprints may have once been
merely a physical act for identifying the defendant, the legal system
must reexamine its understanding of this action now that fingerprints can provide “a direct link to communicative, as well as potentially incriminating information.”263 The same is true for other formats of biometric decryption.
Courts cannot ignore the communicative nature of biometric decryption. Once the device perceives the unique combination of physiological features of the device owner’s face or fingerprint, it provides the user-chosen password264 to decrypt the key which in turn
decrypts the device. Biometric decryption identifies the encrypted
device’s owner by responding to their unique physiological features.
Unlike a password-protected phone, biometric decryption typically
can only be accomplished by the person with the specific features
the encryption was established with.265 This is communicative that
the individual that biometrically decrypts the phone is likely the only
person with control over the device and its contents. Password protected devices allow anyone who knows the password to utilize the
device. Regardless of the format of encryption, decrypting the device still concedes the defendant possessed and controlled the device
and its contents. The communication of confirming the owner’s
identity, sole access, and dominion over the device and its files
makes compelled biometric decryption testimonial, unless the device’s contents are otherwise a foregone conclusion. Therefore, biometric decryption should not flippantly be categorized as an unprotected physical act under the Fifth Amendment.
C. The Problems
Some speculate that stringent Fifth Amendment protections will
lead the government to rely more heavily on the workaround
262

Id. at 1015–16 (quoting the government’s own concession that when the phone has
been turned off, restarted, inactive, or has not been unlocked for a certain amount of time,
only the password will open the device).
263
See Goldman, supra note 8, at 211.
264
See Price & Simonetti, supra note 21, at 42.
265
See Jenkins, supra note 126.
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methods of the Fourth Amendment, such as increased surveillance.266 Such a threat is a viable concern, but the fact that the government can impede one right does not mean we should not protect
another. The focus of this Note is to argue for strict adherence to the
spirit of the Fifth Amendment; however, the Court may find that this
sets a burden that is too high for the government in fighting certain
possession-based digital crimes which the government has an undeniably strong interest in fighting, such as child pornography.
CONCLUSION

Currently, the foregone conclusion doctrine requires some clarification. The Supreme Court must address several issues in order to
provide equitable and consistent results across all U.S. cases. Different scenarios will require a customized approach to address the
particular potential implicit testimonial communications of each situation. Courts must acknowledge that passwords are not evidence,
but a vehicle to access evidence. The Fourth and Fifth Amendment
must be seen individually for the unique protections they each provide to criminal defendants. The foregone conclusion doctrine must
be developed to determine when it applies, to what it applies to, the
appropriate standard for its application, and what burden each element poses to the government. Biometrics should be treated the
same as alphanumeric passwords under the law because of the testimonial features of compelled biometric decryption and to avoid disparate treatment under the law. The spirit of the bill of rights’ protection of criminal defendants must be preserved. Ultimately, the
challenges posed to law enforcement by the advancement in technology does not justify abridging a criminal defendant’s Fifth
Amendment right.
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